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Abstract. This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping
games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An
arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over
the players’ decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum
games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian,
republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.
1. Introduction In this paper an alternative approach to the staff selection competition in the case
of two departments considered by Baston and Garnaev [2] is proposed. The formulation of the problem
in Baston and Garnaev [2] is as follows. Two departments in an organisation are each seeking to make
an appointment within the same area of expertise. The heads of the two departments together interview
the applicants in turn and make their decisions on one applicant before interviewing any others. If a
candidate is rejected by both departmental heads, the candidate cannot be considered for either post at
a later date. When both heads decide to make an offer, they consider the following possibilities.
1. The departments are equally attractive, so that an applicant has no preference between them;
2. One department can offer better prospects to applicants, who will always choose that department.
The departmental heads know that there are precisely N applicants and that each applicant has a level
of expertise which is random. It is assumed that the interview process enables the directors to observe
these levels of expertise, which form a sequence of i.i.d random variables from a continuous distribution.
If no appointment is made to a department from these N applicants, then the department will suffer
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 60C40; Secondary 90A46.
Key words and phrases: correlated equilibria, Nash equilibria, non-zero sum game, secretary problem.
The paper is in final form and no version of it will be published elsewhere.
The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference
in Memory of Jerzy  Los´ (1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004 [25, 26]
[1]
2 D. RAMSEY AND K. SZAJOWSKI
from a shortfall of expertise. Game 2 has one Nash equilibrium, which can be used as the solution
to the problem. Game 1 has many Nash equilibria. This raises the question of equilibrium selection.
Baston and Garnaev [2] interpreted such a variety of Nash equilibria solutions as a way of modelling
different dynamics within the organisation, which can result in various outcomes during the conscription
process. If one departmental head is aggressive and one passive, we might expect a different outcome
to the one in which both are of a similar temperament. When both have a similar temperament one
expects a symmetric strategy and value, but when they have different temperaments one should expect
an asymmetric equilibrium and value. The different character of heads is modelled by the notion of a
Stackleberg leader. Also, the difference in the level of complication of equilibria might also be an argument
justifying this approach to equilibrium selection. It is shown that these non-symmetric equilibria have
the advantage that the players use pure strategies, whereas at the symmetric equilibrium, the players are
called upon to employ specific actions with complicated probabilities.
The staff selection problem presented above is closely related to the best choice problem (BCP).
There are some potential real applications of decision theory which strengthen the motivation of the
BCP (the one decision maker problem). One group of such problems are models of many important
business decisions, such as choosing a venture partner, adopting technological innovation, or hiring an
employee using a sequential decision framework (see Stein, Seale and Rapoport [35], Chun [7, 9, 8, 6]).
Others are an experimental investigations of the ,,secretary problem”, which compare the optimal policy
from the mathematical model with behaviour of human beings (see Seal and Rapoport [31, 32]). We have
not found any such investigation for BCP games. It could be that the theoretical results are not complete
enough to start applied and experimental research.
In spite of the long history of BCP and its generalisations presented in review papers by Freeman
[14], Ferguson [12], Rose [27], Samuels [30], there are also competitive versions, on which researchers’
attention has been focused (see Sakaguchi [28, 29] for review papers). Let us briefly recall the main game
theoretic models of BCP. Enns and Ferenstein [10], Enns, Ferenstein and Sheahan [11] solved a non-zero
sum game related to BCP. Some important mathematical results related to the problem, posed in this
paper, were proven many years later by Bruss and Louchard [3]. The full information version of the game
was solved by Chen, Rosenberg and Shepp [5]. The relation between players is as follows. The players
have numbers: 1 and 2. When an item appears then Player 1 always has the first opportunity to decide
whether to hire the applicant or not (unless she has hired one already). One can say that Player 1 has
priority. If Player 1 does not hire the current applicant, then Player 2 can decide whether to hire the
applicant or not (unless she has hired one already). If neither player hires the current applicant, they
interview the next applicant. The interview process continues until both players have hired an applicant.
A hired applicant does not hesitate and accepts an offer without any delay or additional conditions. The
games in this group of papers have the same strategic scheme as in Game 2.
The concept of equal priority of the players in the selection process in a model of a non-zero-sum game
related to BCP was introduced by Fushimi [15]. Szajowski [36] extended this model to permit random
priority. Ramsey and Szajowski [22, 24] considered a mathematical model of competitive selection with
random priority and random acceptance of the offer (uncertain employment) by candidates. Uncertain
employment is a source of additional problems, which are solved as follows. At each moment n the
candidate is presented to both players. If neither player has yet obtained an object then:
(i) if only one of them would like to accept the state, then he tries to take it. In this case the random
mechanism assigns the availability of the state (which can depend on the player and the moment of
decision n);
(ii) if both of them are interested in this state, then the random device chooses the player who will first
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solicit the state. The availability of the state is the same as in the situation when only one player wants
to take it. If the chosen player obtains the state, he stops searching;
(iii) If this state is not available to the player chosen by the random device, then the observed state at
moment n is lost to both players. Both players continue searching by inspecting the next state.
When one player has obtained a candidate the other player continues searching alone. If this player
wishes to accept a candidate, the probability that it is available to him is the same as in point (i) above.
When a non-zero-sum game does not have a unique Nash equilibrium, then communication between
the players would be useful in deciding which equilibrium should be played. Using the idea of correlated
strategies introduced by [1], the set of possible strategies is extended to the set of correlated stopping
times and the actions undertaken by the players are correlated.
Little research has been carried out on the role of communication between players in stopping games.
[34] and [33] consider correlated equilibria in general dynamic games. The form of correlation is not
unique. The approach applied here is based on a generalisation of randomised stopping times. Various
additional criteria used by the players to correlate their actions restrict the set of possible solutions. These
criteria are based on those used in [18], which resemble ideas of solutions of cooperative games presented
in [37].
Strategies of staff selection based on the construction of correlated strategies according to various
selection criteria are presented in the setting adopted by Baston and Garnaev [2]. Correlated strategy
selection was proposed by the authors in [23].
The construction of correlated equilibria in stopping games is based on the concept of correlated
equilibria in two-by-two bimatrix games. The geometry of correlated equilibria in bimatrix games is
described by Calvo´-Armengol [4].
2. Correlated equilibria in stopping games [1] introduced a correlation scheme in randomised
strategies for non-zero-sum games extending the concept of Nash equilibrium. Using this approach some
process of preplay communication is needed to realise such a strategy. Aumann’s approach has been
extended in various manners (eg see [13, 17, 19, 20, 38]). The process of adapting correlated equilibria to
stopping games starts from the idea of correlated stopping times.
Definition 1. A random sequence qˆ = {(q1n, q
2
n, q
3
n)} such that, for each n,
(i) qin is adapted to Fn for i = 1, 2, 3;
(ii) 0 ≤ q1n ≤ q
2
n ≤ q
3
n ≤ 1 a.s.
is called a correlated stopping strategy. The set of all such sequences will be denoted by QˆN .
Let A1, A2, . . . , AN be a sequence of i.i.d. r.v. with uniform distribution on [0, 1] and independent
of the Markov process (Xn,Fn,Px)
N
n=0. Denote ~qn = (q
1
n, q
2
n, q
3
n). Correlated stopping times are pairs
(λ1(qˆ), λ2(qˆ)) of Markov stopping times with respect to the σ-fields Hn = σ{Fn, {A1, A2, ..., An}} defined
by the strategy qˆ = (~qn) ∈ Qˆ
N as follows:
(1) λ1(qˆ) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : An ≤ q
2
n}
and
(2) λ2(qˆ) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : An ≤ q
1
n or q
2
n < An ≤ q
3
n}.
The strategy qˆ will be called the correlation profile and it defines the pair of stopping times (λ1(qˆ), λ2(qˆ)).
In intuitive terms, the vector ~qn = (q
1
n, q
2
n, q
3
n) defines the joint distribution of the actions taken by
the players at moment n: with probability q1n both players choose the action ”stop”, with probability
q2n − q
1
n Player 1 stops and Player 2 chooses the action ”continue”, with probability q
3
n − q
2
n Player 1
continues and Player 2 stops and with probability 1− q3n both players continue. A correlated strategy qˆ
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is assumed to be defined by preplay communication between the players (either before the start of the
game or before each decision) with the possible aid of an ”external judge”. If communication only takes
place before the game commences, then such a correlation is said to be a stationary correlation device.
If communication may occur at each decision point, then such a correlation is said to be an extensive
(autonomous) correlation device (see [33]). In general, we consider extensive correlation devices. The form
of the correlated strategy is known to both players.
If one player carries out the actions suggested by the external judge with the aid of the appropriate
lottery and the other player departs from the suggested action a formal construction of the possible
strategies and the calculation of the expected gains should be done.
Let pˆ = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) be a sequence in the unit interval. If Player i departs from the correlation
profile qˆ, then the strategy of the other player is based on the marginal correlated profile qˆ−i and the
strategy of Player i is defined by pˆi = pˆ. Denote τ
i((pˆi, qˆ−i)) = τ
i(pˆi) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : A
′
n ≤ pn},
where (A
′
n)
N
n=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. r.v. with uniform distribution on [0, 1], independent of (An)
N
n=1
and independent of the Markov process (Xn,Fn,Px)
N
n=0. Denote G¯i(qˆ) = Gi(λ
1(qˆ)∧ λ2(qˆ), Xλ1(qˆ)∧λ2(qˆ))
and G¯i((pˆi, qˆ−i)) = Gi(τ
i(pˆi)∧λ
−i(qˆ−i), Xτ i(pˆi)∧λ−i(qˆ−i)). The expected payoffs are defined as Gˆi(x, qˆ) =
ExG¯i(qˆ) and Gˆi(x, (pˆi, qˆ−i)) = ExG¯i((pˆi, qˆ−i)), respectively.
Definition 2. A correlated stopping strategy qˆ∗ ∈ QˆN is called a correlated equilibrium point of Gm,
if
(3) Gˆi(x, qˆ
∗) ≥ Gˆi(x, (pˆi, qˆ
∗
−i))
for every x ∈ E, pˆ and i = 1, 2.
This is a definition of a correlated equilibrium in the normal form of the game. It should be noted
that a stronger notion of correlated equilibrium can be introduced by requiring that the correlation must
define an equilibrium in each restricted game where n steps remain (1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1).
3. Selection of a Correlated Equilibrium Since the set of Nash equilibria is a subset of the set
of correlated equilibria, it is clear that whenever the problem of the selection of a Nash equilibria exists,
the problem of the selection of a correlated equilibrium also exists. However, the notion of correlated
equilibrium assumes that communication takes place. Such communication can be used to define the
criteria used by players to select a correlated equilibrium. We now formulate various criteria for selecting
a correlated equilibria. These criteria select subsets of CE. The concepts which are used here do not come
from the concepts of solution to Nash’s problem of cooperative bargaining. These concepts were used by
Greenwald and Hall [18] for computer learning of equilibria in Markov games.
Definition 3. Let us formulate four different selection criteria for correlated equilibria in a stopping
game.
1. A utilitarian correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium constructed recursively in such a way that at
each stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the sum of the values of the game to the players is maximised given
the equilibrium calculated for stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played..
2. An egalitarian correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium constructed recursively in such a way that at
each stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the minimum value is maximised given the equilibrium calculated for
stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
3. A republican correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium constructed recursively in such a way that at
each stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the maximum value is maximised given the equilibrium calculated for
stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
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µ µss µff µfs µsf
µ∗C(α, γ) 0 0 1 0
µ∗D(α, γ) 0 0 0 1
µ∗E(α, γ)
γ
1+γ+αγ 0
1
1+γ+αγ
αγ
1+γ+αγ
µ∗F (α, γ) 0
α
1+α+αγ
1
1+α+αγ
αγ
1+α+αγ
µ∗G(α, γ)
γ
(1+α)(1+γ)
α
(1+α)(1+γ)
1
(1+α)(1+γ)
αγ
(1+α)(1+γ)
Table 1. The five vertices of the correlated equilibrium polytope.
4. A libertarian i correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium constructed recursively in such a way that at
each stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the value of the game to Player i is maximised given the equilibrium
calculated for stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
Theorem 1. The set of correlated equilibrium points satisfying any one of the given criteria above is
not empty.
4. One and two applicant games with no candidate preferences Let us assume that the cost
of not selecting an applicant is c. This is the cost of a shortfall of expertise in a department. If a director
selects an applicant with expertise ξi = x, the department gains x. Let us assume that the candidates
have i.i.d. expertise ξi with uniform distribution on [0, 1]. If there is only one candidate, then the selection
process will end with value d = 12Eξ1−
1
2c =
1−2c
4 to both players (both want to select and the probability
of winning is 12 for both of them). Let b = max{0,
1−2c
4 }.
4.1. Correlated equilibria of the two stage game When there are two candidates, then we have a two
stage game. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria at the stage when the first candidate is interviewed will
be considered. The payoff bimatrix M2(x) is of the form (see [2]):
(4) M2(x) =
s f
s
f
(
(
(x+ 1
2
)
2 ,
(x+ 1
2
)
2 ) (x,
1
2 )
(12 , x) (d, d)
)
The game has one pure Nash equlilibrium, (s, s), for x ≥ 12 and for x ≤ b has one pure Nash equilibrium
(f, f). However, for x ∈ [b, 12 ] there are two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria and one symmetric Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Without extra assumptions it is not clear which equilibrium should be
played. Baston and Garnaev [2] have proposed that if the players have a similar character, then the
symmetric solution should be played. In the non-symmetric case the idea of Stackleberg equilibrium
can be adopted. It is assumed that the first player will be the Stackleberg leader and the 1-Stackleberg
equilibrium is the solution of the problem selected.
We will use an extensive communication device to construct correlated equilibria. In general, correlated
equilibria are not unique. Usually the set of correlated equilibria contain the convex hull of Nash equilibria.
However, natural selection criteria can be proposed and the possibility of preplay communication and
use of an arbitrator solve the problem of solution selection. The players just specify the criterion. Such
criteria are formulated in Section 3. The set of solutions which fulfil one of the points 1-4 in definition 3
are not empty.
ForM2(x), when x ∈ [b,
1
2 ] the set of correlated equilibria is a polytope with five vertices. Let α =
1
2
x− 1
2
d−x
and γ = 2 d−x
x− 1
2
and let us denote µ = (µss, µff , µfs, µsf ). The polytope of correlated equilibria for the
considered game has the five vertices given in Table 1 (see Peeters and Potters [21]). The value at each
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vertex will be calculated.
(C) The values of the game to the players at vertex C are denoted by v
(C)
1 and v
(C)
2 .
v
(C)
1 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
∫ 1
2
b
1
2
dx+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(x +
1
2
)dx = b2 −
1
2
b+
9
16
(5)
v
(C)
2 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
∫ 1
2
b
xdx +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(x +
1
2
)dx =
1
2
b2 +
7
16
(6)
When Player 1 takes the role of Stackleberg leader his expected gain is v
(C)
1 , while the Stackleberg follower
has v
(C)
2 (see [2]).
(D) The values at vertex D can be obtained from those at vertex C, because matrixM2(x) is symmetric.
v
(D)
1 =
1
2
b2 +
7
16
(7)
v
(D)
2 = b
2 −
1
2
b+
9
16
(8)
(E) The expected gain of the players at correlated equilibrium E given the expertise of the candidate
x ∈ [b, 12 ] is of the form.
w
(E)
1 = (x+
1
2
)
x− 12
2(d− 12 )
+
1
2
(x+
1
2
)
d− x
d− 12
(9)
=
1
2
(x+
1
2
)
w
(E)
2 =
1
2
(x+
1
2
).(10)
The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex E is
v
(E)
1 = v
(E)
2 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
1
2
∫ 1
b
(x+
1
2
)dx =
3
4
b2 −
1
4
b+
1
2
.(11)
The values at these three vertices are such that v
(D)
1 < v
(E)
1 < v
(C)
1 .
(F) This correlated equilibrium is of the form: µss = 0 and
µff =
x− 12
4d− 3x− 12
µsf =
2(d− x)
4d− 3x− 12
µfs = µsf .
The expected gain of the players at correlated equilibrium F given the expertise of candidate x ∈ [b, 12 ] is
w
(F )
1 = w
(F )
2 =
d(x− 12 ) + 2(d− x)(x +
1
2 )
4(d− x) + x− 12
(12)
=
1
2
(x+
1
2
) +
(x − 12 )(d−
x
2 −
1
4 )
4d− 3x− 12
≤
1
2
(x+
1
2
)
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for x ∈ [b, 12 ]. The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex F is
v
(F )
1 = v
(F )
2 = v
(E)
1 +
∫ 1
2
b
(x− 12 )(d −
x
2 −
1
4 )
4d− 3x− 12
dx(13)
< v
(E)
1 .
(G) This correlated equilibrium (the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies) is of the form:
µss =
4(d− x)2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
µff =
(x− 12 )
2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
µsf =
2(d− x)(x − 12 )
(2d− x− 12 )
2
µfs = µsf .
The expected gain of the players at correlated equilibrium G given the expertise of the candidate x ∈ [b, 12 ]
is
w
(G)
1 = w
(G)
2 =
2(d− x)2(x − 12 ) + 2(d− x)(x +
1
2 )(x−
1
2 ) + d(x −
1
2 )
2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
(14)
=
1
2
(x +
1
2
) +
(x− 12 )
2[d− 12 (x+
1
2 )]
(2d− x− 12 )
2
≤
1
2
(x +
1
2
)
for x ∈ [b, 12 ]. The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex G is
v
(G)
1 = v
(G)
2 = v
(E)
1 +
∫ 1
2
b
(x− 12 )
2[d− 12 (x+
1
2 )]
(2d− x− 12 )
2
dx(15)
< v
(E)
1 .
4.2. Selection of equilibria in the two stage game Let us apply the selection criteria on the set of
correlated equilibria of the two stage game. We thus define a linear programming problem, in which
the objective function is defined by the criterion and the feasible set is the set of vectors µ defining a
correlated equilibrium. Hence to find a solution, we compare the appropriate values at each vertex of the
correlated equilibria polytope described in the previous section.
It should be noted that when either the republican or egalitarian criterion is used, the solution is
given by the appropriate solution from one of two linear programming problems. In these cases the two
linear programming problems are:
1) Maximise v1 given the equilibrium constraints and the constraint v1 ≤ v2 when the egalitarian condi-
tion is used or v1 ≥ v2 when the republican condition is used.
2) Maximise v2 given the equilibrium constraints and the constraint v2 ≤ v1 when the egalitarian condi-
tion is used or v2 ≥ v1 when the republican condition is used.
From the symmetry of the game the hyperplane µfs − µsf = 0 splits the set of correlated equilibria
into the two feasible sets for these problems and µ = (0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 ) becomes a vertex of the feasible set in
each of the problems. We call this vertex H . This vertex replaces vertex C or vertex D depending on the
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additional constraint. We have
(16) v
(H)
1 = v
(H)
2 =
v
(C)
1 + v
(D)
1
2
= v
(E)
1
4.2.1. Libertarian equilibria From (5)–(15) it follows that the maximal game value for the first player
is guaranteed at vertex (f, s) and for the second player at (s, f). It means that δ⋆L1 = (f, s) = C is the
libertarian 1 and δ⋆L2 = (s, f) = D is the libertarian 2 correlated equilibrium. In relation to the solutions
presented by Baston and Garnaev, the libertarian i equilibrium corresponds to the Stackleberg solution
at which Player i takes the role of the Stackleberg leader.
4.2.2. Egalitarian equilibria Let us denote vδ = mini∈{1,2} v
δ
i . We are looking for δ
⋆
E such that v
δ⋆
E =
maxδ v
δ. For δ ∈ {E,F,G,H} we have vδ1 = v
δ
2, v
(F )
1 < v
(E)
1 = v
(H)
1 and v
(G)
1 < v
(E)
1 . For δ ∈ {C,D}
the minimal values are v(C) = v
(C)
2 and v
(D) = v
(D)
1 . Moreover, v
(C)
2 = v
(D)
1 < v
(E)
1 . Therefore E and
H define egalitarian equilibria and vδ
⋆
E = v
(E)
1 . It follows that any linear combination of these equilibria
pE + (1 − p)H , where p ∈ [0, 1] defines an egalitarian equilibrium. It should be noted that H is an
intuitively pleasing solution, since it corresponds to a solution in which the players observe the toss of a
coin and if heads appears Player 1 acts as the Stackleberg leader, otherwise Player 2 plays this role. This
is one of the solutions considered by Baston and Garnaev. At any of the other solutions the arbitrator
must send signals to each of the players separately in order to obtain the appropriate correlation. It should
be noted that the value of the game to the players is independent of the egalitarian solution adopted.
4.2.3. Republican equilibria Let us denote V δ = maxi∈{1,2} v
δ
i . Similar consideration of the vertices as
made in the case of egalitarian equilibria leads to conclusion that the republican equilibria are δ⋆R ∈ {C,D}
and V δ
⋆
R = v
(C)
1 = v
(D)
2 . These are the only two solutions, since they are the unique solutions of the
two appropriate linear programming programmes described above and correspond to the Stackleberg
solutions.
4.2.4. Utilitarian equilibria Let us denote vδ+ = v
δ
1 + v
δ
2. We have v
(C)
+ = v
(D)
+ =
3
2b
2 − b2 + 1 = 2v
(E)
1 .
Since 2b ≤ x + 12 , it follows that v
(C)
+ > v
(F )
+ and v
(C)
+ > v
(G)
+ . Hence, C,D and E are utilitarian
equilibria. It follows that any linear combination pC + qD + rE (p, q, r ≥ 0, p + q + r = 1) defines a
utilitarian equilibrium. v
δ⋆
U
+ = v
(C)
+ = v
(D)
+ = v
(E)
+ . It should be noted that H is a linear comibination of
these three vertices with p = q = 12 , r = 0. Also, the value of the game to the players is dependent on the
utilitarian equilibrium played.
5. Selection of equilibria in the multi-stage game We define correlated equilibria by recursion
as a series of correlated equilibria in the appropriately defined matrix games. The correlated strategy
used when both players are deciding whether to accept or reject the n-th last candidate is given by
µn = (µn,ss, µn,ff , µn,fs, µn,sf ). The game played on observing the n-th last candidate is given by
Mn(x) =
s f
s
f
(
(x+un−12 ,
x+un−1
2 ) (x, un−1)
(un−1, x) (v
π
n−1, w
π
n−1)
)
,
where un is the optimal expected reward of a lone searcher with n candidates remaining (see [2]) and
vπn , w
π
n are the values of the n-stage game to Players 1 and 2, respectively, when the equilibrium π is
played. From the form of the payoff matrix it can be seen that (s, s) is the unique Nash equilibrium when
x > un−1. Similarly, (f, f) is the unique Nash equilibrium when x < min{v
π
n−1, w
π
n−1}.
5.1. Libertarian equilibria First we consider N = 3. From the calculations made for N = 2, it follows
that vL12 > w
L1
2 . Considering the payoff matrix (f, s) is the unique Nash equilibrium for v
L1
2 < x < w
L1
2
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and both (f, s) and (s, f) are pure Nash equilibrium for vL12 < x < u2. There is also an equilibrium in
mixed strategies on this interval. Thus, we only need to consider equilibrium selection for vL12 < x < u2.
Since the payoff matrix is now longer symmetric, the vertices of the polytope defining the set of correlated
equilibrium are of a different form. However, since (f, s) is a Nash equilibrium, µ3 = (0, 0, 1, 0) is a vertex
of this polytope. For vL12 < x < u2, it can be seen that u2 is the maximal payoff in the payoff matrix. It
follows that µ3 is the vertex that strictly maximises the expected payoff of Player 1 and thus uniquely
defines the libertarian 1 equilibrium. It follows that vL13 > w
L1
3 and hence M4(x) is of a similar form to
M3(x). By iteration it follows that Player 1 plays the role of the Stackleberg leader at the libertarian 1
solution. Analogously, Player 2 plays the role of the Stackleberg leader at the libertarian 2 solution. For
the value functions see [2].
5.2. Egalitarian equilibrium It will be shown by induction that for N ≥ 3 an egalitarian equilibrium
is of the same form as for N = 2. Suppose that vEn−1 = w
E
n−1. The coordinates of the vertices of the
polytope describing the set of correlated equilibria is of the form given in Table 1 with α = un−1−x2(x−vn−1)
and γ = 2(x−vn−1)
un−1−x
. Considering the values of the game at these vertices when x ∈ [vn−1, un−1], the
egalitarian criterion is satisfied at vertices E and H . It follows that vEn = w
E
n and any linear combination
of E and H defines an egalitarian equilibrium. Since vE2 = v
E
2 it follows by induction that an egalitarian
equilibrium is of the required form. In particular, the equilibrium obtained by deciding who plays the
role of Stackleberg leader based on the result of a coin toss defines an egalitarian equilibrium.
5.3. Republican equilibria Suppose libertarian 1 is taken to be the republican equilibrium for the last
2 stages. For N = 3 the calculations are similar to the calculations made for the libertarian 1 equilibrium.
It can be shown that the libertarian 1 equilibrium again maximises the maximum value. Using an iterative
argument, it can be shown that the libertarian 1 equilibrium is a republican equilibrium. By the symmetry
of the game it follows that the libertarian 2 equilibrium is also a republican equilibrium.
5.4. Utilitarian equilibria Unfortunately, the value function of a utilitarian equilibrium for N = 2
is not uniquely defined. In order to find a ”globally optimal” utilitarian equilibrium, we cannot use
simple recursion. From the form of the payoff matrix it can be seen that when max{vn−1, wn−1} <
x < un−1 the maximum sum of payoffs is x + un−1. This is obtained when at least one of the players
accepts the candidate. Such a payoff is attainable at a correlated equilibrium, since (f, s) and (s, f) are
correlated equilibrium. It follows from the definition of a utilitarian equilibrium that µn,ff = 0 when
max{vn−1, wn−1} < x < un−1.
Theorem 2. The libertarian equilibria are the only globally optimal utilitarian equilibria for N ≥
3 (ignoring strategies whose actions differ from those defined by one of these strategies on a set with
probability measure zero).
Proof First we show that among the set of utilitarian equilibria the minimum value is minimised
at the libertarian equilibria for N ≥ 2. Considering the values of the game at the vertices of the set of
utilitarian correlated equilibria when N = 2 (obtained by adding the additional condition that µ2,ff = 0
for b < x < 12 ), the minimum value is minimised at the two libertarian equilibria. From the form of the
two linear programming problems that define this minimisation problem, it follows that these solutions
are the only such solutions.
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By symmetry wL1n = v
L2
n . Set k
π
n = min{v
π
n, w
π
n}. Assume that w
L1
n < k
π
n for all π 6= L1, L2. We have
wL1n+1 =
∫ wL1
n
0
wL1n dx+
∫ un
wL1
n
xdx+
1
2
∫ 1
un
(x+ un)dx
kπn+1 ≥
∫ kπ
n
0
kπndx+
∫ un
kπ
n
gπn(x)dx +
1
2
∫ 1
un
(x+ un)dx,
where gπn(x) is the expected reward of such a player given that x ∈ [k
π
n , un]. From the condition that
µn,ff = 0 it follows that g
π
n(x) ≥ x, ∀x ∈ [k
π
n , un] and
kπn+1 − w
L1
n+1 ≥ (k
π
n)
2 − (wL1n )
2 −
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
xdx =
(kπn)
2 − (wL1n )
2
2
> 0.
Since among utilitarian equilibria the minimum value is minimised at the libertarian equilibria when
N = 2, it follows by induction that among utilitarian equilibria the minimum value is minimised at the
libertarian equilibria for n ≥ 2. By symmetry vL1n + w
L1
n = v
L2
n + w
L2
n .
We now show that the libertarian strategies are the only globally optimal utilitarian strategies for
N ≥ 3. From the analysis of the two stage game vπ2 + w
π
2 =
3b2
2 −
b
2 + 1 for any utilitarian equilibrium.
Suppose vL1n + w
L1
n > v
π
n + w
π
n . From the conditions for a utilitarian equilibrium π, it follows that
vπn+1 + w
π
n+1 =
∫ kπ
n
0
(vπn + w
π
n)dx+
∫ 1
kπ
n
(x+ un)dx
vL1n+1 + w
L1
n+1 − (v
π
n+1 + w
π
n+1) =
∫ wL1
n
0
[vL1n + w
L1
n − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx +
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx
>
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx
=
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
L1
n + w
L1
n ) + v
L1
n + w
L1
n − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx > 0.
This inequality follows from the induction assumption vL1n +w
L1
n −(v
π
n+w
π
n) > 0, together with v
L1
n < un.
It can be shown that vL13 +w
L1
3 − (v
π
3 +w
π
3 ) > 0 using a similar argument for n = 2 (the first inequality
in the argument becomes an equality). It follows by induction that for N ≥ 3 the libertarian equilibria
are the only utilitarian equilibria which are globally optimal in the sense of the utilitarian criterion.
6. Final remarks In his recent paper, Garnaev [16] has extended the game model introduced in
Baston and Garnaev [2] to consider the situation where three skills of the candidate are taken into
account. The proposed solutions to Garnaev’s problem are Nash equilibria and Stackelberg strategies, as
in [2], and these solutions are derived in his paper. One can also construct correlated equilibria for this
model, which will be the subject of further investigation.
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